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§ 6.1. Tenant at Sufferance- Ability to Maintain An Action to Enforce 
the State Sanitary Code and the State Building Code.* Technically, a 
tenancy at sufferance1 is not a tenancy at all because it involves no privity 
of estate2 or contract3 between the landlord and the tenant. 4 At common 
law such a tenant, although not liable for rent, had no more than naked 
possession of the premises,5 and was not entitled to notice to quit, and had 
no action against her landlord or other person entitled to possession if she 
was ejected without unnecessary force. 6 The tenant at sufferance was not 
liable for criminal trespass, however, because her entry was lawful. 7 In 
addition, a landlord was not liable to a tenant at sufferance in tort actions 
for injuries sustained by the tenant due to the condition of the premises. 8 
The landlord owed only the duty not to injure the tenant wantonly or 
willfully. 9 
Susanna C. Burgett, Marguerite M. Dom, Renee M. Landers, Marianne T. McCabe, 
Erica Rosenberg. 
* Renee M. Landers, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 6.1. 1 A tenancy at sufferance arises when one in lawful possession of property under 
authority or title of the owner, that is, a tenant for years or at will, remains in possession 
after the right under which she entered expires. The landlord does not consent to the 
continued occupancy, but merely fails to take an affirmative step to oust the tenant. Such a 
tenancy entitles the tenant only to naked possession. Since the tenancy at sufferance is not 
based on any contract, express or implied, few rights, duties or liabilities exist. H. 
STAVISKY, LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW, 33 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES§§ 101, 103 (1977 & 
1984 Supp.); R. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT,§ 2:20 (1980). 
2 H. STAVISKY, supra note 1, at§ 101; R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 1 at§ 2:20. 
3 
_.H. STAVISKY, supra note 1, at§ 103; Benton v. Williams, 202 Mass. 189, 192, 88 N.E. 
843, 844 (1909). 
4 H. STAVISKY, supra note 1, at§ 101. 
5 /d. Benton v. Williams, 202 Mass. 189, 192, 88 N.E. 843, 844 (1909). 
6 Benton v. Williams, 202 Mass. at 192, 88 N.E. at 844 (1909); R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra 
note 1, at § 2:21. 
7 This common law principle has been codified in G.L. c. 266, § 120. H. STAVISKY, supra 
note 1, at § 103. 
8 Margosian v. Markarian, 288 Mass. 197, 199, 192 N.E. 612, 613 (1934); R. SCHOSHINSKI, 
supra note 1, at § 2:20. 
9 Margosian v. Markarian, 288 Mass. at 199, 192 N.E. at 613 (1934). See also Carney v. 
Conveyancers Title Insurance & Mortgage Co., 309 Mass. 197, 200, 34 N.E.2d 654, 655 
(1941); R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 1, at § 2:20. 
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Over the years, the common law status of the tenant at sufferance in 
Massachusetts has been altered by statute and decisional law. Section 3 of 
Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 186 requires that a tenant at suffer-
ance pay rent for the use and occupation of the premises. 10 Another 
statute provides that the tenant at sufferance may be evicted only by 
summary process.U Very early, the tenant at sufferance was entitled, by 
Massachusetts law, to a reasonable time to remove herself from the 
premises upon being given notice to quit, though she was not entitled to 
statutory notice. 12 
In 1977, in King v. G & M Realty, 13 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court suggested that it would be inclined to give tenants at sufferance 
more than narrow rights to sue a landlord in tort for injuries sustained on 
the premises. 14 The King case concerned a tenant under a statutory 
14-day notice to quit who sought to maintain an action in tort against the 
landlord to recover for injuries sustained on the premises where the 
14-day period had not yet expired. 15 While the Court declined to deter-
mine whether the tenant's status had been converted to that of a tenant at 
sufferance by the notice to quit, it noted that the tenant in that situation 
should not be regarded as a mere trespasser when he could not be lawfully 
dispossessed of the property until the 14-day notice to quit expired. 16 The 
Court observed that "even at common law such a tenant was not a 
trespasser but a 'licensee,' if only a 'bare one,' and that the effect of 
modem legislation may well be to give him a more honorific status than 
that [of a licensee)." 17 
During the Survey year, in Brown v. Guerrier, 18 the Supreme Judicial 
Court enhanced the rights and status of the tenant at sufferance beyond 
that granted to the tenant by the King decision. 19 In Guerrier, the Court 
held that a tenant at sufferance who continues to pay rent is entitled to 
maintain an action against the owner for relief from violations of the 
implied warranty of habitability as determined by the State Sanitary 
10 G.L. c. 186, § 3. The statute provides: "Tenants at sufferance in possession of land or 
tenements shall be liable to pay rent therefor for such time as they may occupy or detain the 
same.'' 
11 G.L. c. 184, § 18. The statute provides in relevant part: "No person shall atte~t to 
recover possession of land or tenements in any manner other than through an action brought 
pursuant to chapter two hundred and thirty-nine or such other proceedings authorized by 
law." See also H. STAVISKY, supra note 1, at§ 103. 
12 H. STAVISKY, supra note 1, at § 104 and n.84. 
13 373 Mass. 658, 664, 370 N.E.2d 413 (1977). 
14 /d. at 664, 370 N.E.2d 413, 416. 
15 Id. at 663-64, 370 N.E.2d 413, 416 (1977). 
16 /d. 
17 /d. at 663-64, 370 N.E.2d 413, 416-17. 
18 390 Mass. 631, 457 N.E.2d 630 (1983). 
19 Id. at 634, 457 N.E.2d at 632. 
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Code, and from a violation of local board of health standards. 20 The Court 
reserved the question of whether a tenant at sufferance has rights to 
enforce provisions of the State Building Code against the landlord under 
chapter 186, section 14 of the General Laws, though the Court did discuss 
how it might decide the issue in future cases. 21 
The plaintiff, Brown, was a tenant at sufferance in premises owned by 
the defendant landlord. 22 Brown filed a complaint in the Boston Housing 
Court seeking an order that the defendant make certain repairs to bring 
the premises into compliance with the State Sanitary Code23 and with the 
State Building Code.24 Violations found in an inspection then conducted 
by the Inspectional Services Department of the City of Boston included: 
defective heating equipment, a front porch not in good repair, defective 
waste pipes in the cellar, a defective kitchen stove leaking gas, a defective 
bathroom wash basin and toilet, a defective electrical switch and fixtures, 
windows not in good repair, need for extermination of insects and ro-
dents, hall walls not in good repair, insufficient receptacles for storage of 
garbage, and lack of maintenance of the common areas in a clean and 
sanitary manner. 25 At trial, the parties stipulated to the continued exis-
tence of these violations of the sanitary and building codes. 26 In opposi-
tion to the plaintiff's action, the defendant contended that the plaintiff 
was not entitled to the relief sought because she was a tenant at suffer-
ance, under a court order to vacate the premises.27 The tenant had 
20 /d. 
21 !d. at 635, 457 N.E.2d at 633. 
22 !d. at 632, 457 N.E.2d at 631. 
23 105 C.M.R. § 410.001 (1978). 
24 780 C.M.R. § 100.1 (1980). Brown v. Guerrier, 390 Mass. 631, 632, 457 N.E.2d 630, 631 
(1983). 
25 Brief for Appellant, at 8-9 and Appendix to Brief for Appellant at 8, Brown v. Guerrier, 
390 Mass. 631, 457 N.E.2d 630 (1983). The defects in the electrical switch and fixtures also 
constituted violations of the State Building Code. Brief for Appellant at 8 and Appendix to 
Brief for Appellant at 9. 
26 390 Mass. 631,632,457 N.E.2d 630,631 (1983). See Brief for Appellant at 9. 
27 390 Mass. 631, 632, 457 N.E.2d 630, 631 (1983). In July, 1982, the tenant was served 
with a 14-day notice to quit for nonpayment of rent by her landlord. The tenant had been 
withholding rent due to numerous substandard conditions in her apartment. Brief for 
Appellant at 3. In August, 1982, the landlord obtained a judgment for possession against the 
tenant in a summary process action. !d. at 4. On September 30, 1982, the tenant filed an 
injunctive action seeking to restrain the landlord from levying execution upon the summary 
process. !d. at 6. The tenant was successful in obtaining a stay against further action by the 
landlord to obtain possession. !d. at 7. This stay was conditioned on payment to the landlord 
of the contract rent ($175 per month) for use and occupancy for every month the tenant 
remained in possession pending appeal. !d. at 7. The tenant had already paid to the court 
$1,000 in rent she had withheld. !d. at 7-8. On October 21, 1982, the tenant filed the action 
the Court considered on appeal in Brown v. Guerrier after the inspection conducted by the 
Inspectional Services Department of the City of Boston. !d. at 8 and 10. 
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continued to pay rent during her occupancy of the premises and the 
landlord had accepted the rent payments.28 
The Boston Housing Court agreed with the tenant that she was entitled 
to an injunction restraining the landlord from failing to remedy the build-
ing and sanitary code violations. 29 It was the intent of the Legislature in 
enacting the statutes authorizing the codes, the court reasoned, to super-
sede common law conceptions of the duties landlords owed to tenants at 
sufferance and to expand the concept of the warranty of quiet enjoyment 
to cover all foreseeable users of residential rental property and not only 
those users who have a contractual relationship with the landlord. 30 In its 
order, however, the court noted that a single justice of the Appeals Court 
had suggested that tenants at sufferance may have fewer rights than other 
occupants under Massachusetts landlord-tenant statutes.3' For this rea-
son, the Housing Court judge referred to the Appeals Court the issue of 
the interpretation of chapter 186, section 14 and chapter 111, section 127H 
as these statutes may expand on the common law duties of landlords to 
tenants at sufferance.32 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted the plaintiff's application for direct 
appellate review. 33 Since the defendant did not file a brief,, however, no 
28 390 Mass. at 633-34, 457 N.E.2d at 632. 
29 Id. at 631-32, 457 N.E.2d at 631. See Preliminary Injunction and Order for Report of 
Case under Rule 64, MAss. R. Civ. P., Boston Housing Court, Docket No. 14425 at 6 and 7. 
in Appendix to Brief for Appellant at 38 and 39. 
30 Preliminary Injunction and Order at 6-7, in Appendix to Brief for Appellant at 38-9. 
31 I d. See Brief for Appellant at 10. 
32 Id. at 7 and 8, Appendix at 39 and 40. See Rule 64, MAss. R. Civ. P. 
G.L. c. 111, § 127H provides in relevant part: 
Any tenant who rents space in a building for residential purposes wherein a condition 
exists which is in violation of the standards of fitness for human habitation established 
under the state sanitary code or in violation of any board of health standards, which 
condition may endanger or materially impair his health or well-being or the health or 
well-being of the public, may file a petition against the owner of said building to 
enforce the provisions of the said code in the superior court. 
G.L. c. 186, § 14 provides in relevant part: 
Any lessor or landlord of any building or part thereof occupied for dwelling purposes, 
other than a room or rooms in a hotel, but including a mobile home or land therefor, 
who is required by law or by the express or implied terms of any contract or lease or 
tenancy at will to furnish water, hot water, heat, light, power, gas, elevator service, 
telephone service, janitor service or refrigeration service to any occupant of such 
building or part thereof, who willfully or intentionally fails to furnish such water, hot 
water, heat, light, power, gas, elevator service, telephone service, janitor service or 
refrigeration service at any time when the same is necessary to the proper or 
customary use of such building or part thereof, or any lessor or landlord who directly 
or indirectly interferes with the furnishing by another of such utilities or services, ... 
or any lessor or landlord who directly or indirectly interferes with the quiet enjoyment 
of any residential premises by the occupant, or who attempts to regain possession of 
such premises by force without benefit of judicial process, shall be punished .... 
33 390 Mass. at 632, 457 N.E.2d at 631. 
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adversarial proceeding was presented and the Court dismissed the report 
of the Housing Courtjudge. 34 In an opinion by Justice Wilkins, the Court 
held that the tenant at sufferance has a right to obtain relief against the 
landlord for sanitary and local health code violations through actions 
under chapter 111, section 127H.35 On the issue of tenants at sufferance 
enforcing the building code through chapter 186, section 14, however, the 
Court reserved judgment. 36 
The Court first addressed the question of whether chapter 111, section 
127H gave a tenant at sufferance the right to file a petition against the 
owner of property to enforce state sanitary code provisions and local 
board of health standards.37 The Court noted that, ifthis statute were held 
to apply to a tenant at sufferance, the rights of such a tenant would be far 
greater than the rights conferred by common law. 38 In concluding that 
tenants at sufferance may enforce the sanitary code against landlords, the 
Court emphasized that the language of the statute extends the right to 
enforce the sanitary code to "any tenant who rents space." 39 A tenant at 
sufferance, the Court stated, was a tenant of sorts, especially since the 
tenant in this case continued to pay rent during the period of her tenancy 
at sufferance. 40 
In addition to the words of the statute, the Court relied on the legislative 
purpose behind the enactment of section 127H.41 According to the Court, 
this section was not intended to regulate the individual relationships 
between owners and tenants. Rather, the statute was designed to serve 
the public interest by using private tenant initiatives to preserve and 
rehabilitate the state's housing stock. 42 
Finally, the Court found that anyone competent to make an oath, 
including a tenant at sufferance, may make out a criminal complaint for 
34 !d. 
35 /d. at 633-34, 457 N.E.2d at 632. 
36 /d. at 635, 457 N.E.2d at 633. Before reaching those issues, the Court first held that the 
report of the Housing Court judge must be discharged because the defendant did not file a 
brief with the Court and was thus not entitled to a decision. !d. at 632, 457 N.E.2d at 631 
(citing Commonwealth v. Petralia, 372 Mass. 452, 454, 362 N.E.2d 513, 516 (1977)). The 
Court noted, however, that it has discretion to decide matters not strictly before it, when the 
case has been fully briefed on the merits, when there is a public interest in obtaining a 
prompt answer to the question, and when the answer to be given is reasonably clear. 390 
Mass. at 631, 457 N.E.2d at 631, (citing Moore v. Election Commissioners of Cambridge, 
309 Mass. 303, 305-06, 35 N.E.2d 222, 227 (1941)). 
37 390 Mass. at 633-34, 457 N.E.2d at 632. 
38 /d. at 633, 457 N.E.2d at 632. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the rights of tenants at sufferance at common law. 
39 390 Mass. at 633, 457 N.E.2d at 632. 
40 /d. at 633-34, 457 N.E.2d at 632. 
41 /d. at 634, 457 N.E.2d at 632. 
42 /d. 
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violation of the sanitary code. 43 A holding that the tenant at sufferance 
could maintain an action under section 127H to obtain equitable relief for 
sanitary code violations, the Court reasoned, would avoid the inconsis-
tency that would result if a tenant at sufferance could not obtain such 
relief, even though he could make a criminal complaint against the 
owner. 44 
The Court next considered whether an injunction to correct the building 
code violations could be issued under chapter 186, section 14. This stat-
ute, the Court observed, places criminal penalties on "any lessor or 
landlord of any building or part thereof occupied for dwelling purposes'' 
who "willfully or intentionally fails to furnish" certain services when the 
landlord or lessor is required by law to do so, and when the service is 
necessary to the proper or customary use of the building or any part of 
it. 45 The section also provides criminal penalties, the Court explained, for 
any lessor or landlord who interferes with the quiet enjoyment of any 
residential premises by the occupant. 46 In addition, section 14 contains a 
provision, noted the Court, for the enforcement of its requirements by 
private actions. 47 
The Court observed that its reasoning concerning the application of 
chapter 111, section 127H to a tenant at sufferance would be "appropri-
ate'' in deciding at a later time whether a tenant at sufferance has rights · 
under the building code. 48 The Court, however, reserved for future resolu-
tion in an adversary proceeding the question to what extent section 14 
applies to a tenant at sufferance.49 Whether section 14 applies to the 
building code violations cited in this case, the Court stated, is not so easily 
determined as to warrant the Court's opinion.50 The difficulty existed, 
according to the Court, because the record did not show clearly that the 
defendant was required by law to furnish the light and power unavailable 
due to the electrical defectsY For this reason the Court declined to 
determine the extent of a tenant at sufferance's right to quiet enjoyment of 
the premises as provided in section 14, and whether defective switches 
interfered with that right. 52 
In Brown v. Guerrier, the Supreme Judicial Court advanced landlord-
43 ld. 
44 ld. 
45 Id. at 635, 457 N.E.2d at 632-33. 
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tenant law significantly from "medieval to modem times" 53 by holding 
that a tenant's ability to enforce the sanitary code does not depend on her 
status at common law. 54 The Guerrier holding continues the judicial 
transformation of landlord-tenant law55 that the Court began with its 
decision in Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway. 56 In that case, the 
Court replaced the doctrine of independent covenants with an implied 
warranty of habitability in residential leases which predicated the tenant's 
obligation to pay rent on the landlord's obligation to deliver and maintain 
the premises in a habitable condition.57 This shift in doctrine, combined 
with the gradual statutory alteration of tenants' common law rights, 58 has 
added to the rights of tenants. The Court has applied the implied warranty 
of habitability doctrine in Mounsey v. Ellard,59 King v. G. & M. Realty,60 
Young v. Garwacki,61 and Crowell v. McCaffrey. 62 This line of landlord-
tenant tort liability cases evidences an effort by the Court to accomplish 
major changes in landlord-tenant law. The Mounsey, King, and Garwacki 
cases indicate the Court's intention to abolish status with respect to land 
as a precondition to tort recovery against landlords for failure to maintain 
the premises. In Crowell, the Court linked recoveries for the landlord's 
breach of the implied warranty of habitability with developments in the 
53 See Dillard, Landlord's Liability to Tenant's Guest for Negligence, 1980 ANN. SuRv. 
MAss. LAw § 6.5 at 246. 
54 390 Mass. at 634, 457 N.E.2d at 632. 
55 See generally Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 
B.C. L. REV. 503 (1982). 
56 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973). See Schwartz, Landlord and Tenant: Expanding 
Civil Remedies for the Tenant, 1973 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAw§ 1.4 at 12; Student Comment, 
Residential Leases: Implied Warranty of Habitability: BHA v. Hemingway, 1973 ANN. 
SURV. MASS. LAW §1.9 at 18. 
57 363 Mass. at 199, 293 N.E.2d 831, 834. 
58 /d. at 196, 293 N.E.2d at 840-41 (quoting, Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law in 
HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS, pp. 222-23 (1934)). 
59 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 42 (1973). In Mounsey, the Court held that a landlord's duty 
to maintain the premises should no longer be predicated on the status of the injured party as 
either a licensee or an invitee. /d. at 707-08, 297 N.E.2d at 51. The Court instead created a 
duty of reasonable care, which the owner owes to all lawful visitors. /d. at 707, 297 N.E.2d 
at 51. See also Student Comment, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duty of Reasonable 
Care Established for Lawful Entrants: Mounsey v. Ellard, 1973 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW§ 
1l.l7 at 325. 
60 373 Mass. 658, 370 N.E.2d 413 (l977)(tenant, even though a tenant at sufferance, could 
sue the landlord for injuries caused by the landlord's negligent maintenance of the premises). 
61 380 Mass. 162, 402 N.E.2d 1045 (l980)(action in tort against the landlord could be 
sustained by a tenant's guest who is injured as a result of negligently maintained premises 
under the tenant's control). 
62 377 Mass. 433, 386 N.E.2d 1256 (1979)(tenant could sue a landlord for damages in tort 
for the landlord's failure to maintain the premises in compliance with the implied warranty of 
habitability); discussed in Bergstresser, Torts, 1979 ANN. SuRv. MASS. LAW§ 14.8 at 386. 
7
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area of landlord-tenant tort law. 63 The Court's dicta in King strongly 
implied that a tenant at sufferance would be permitted to sue a landlord in 
tort. 64 When the King decision is read with Crowell, it follows that a 
tenant at sufferance could sue in tort for the landlord's breach of the 
implied warranty of habitability. 65 The Court's decision in Guerrier is a 
logical extension of these cases. If the tenant at sufferance could sue in 
tort based on the landlord's breach of implied warranty, then allowing the 
tenant at sufferance the right to sue to enforce the implied warranty of 
habitability as codified in chapter 111, section 127H before she is injured 
due to its breach is reasonable. 
The Court acted prudently in reserving a decision on the issue of 
whether tenants at sufferance may maintain actions under chapter 186, 
section 14 to enforce the building code and their rights to quiet enjoyment 
of the premises.66 To establish a case for relief under section 14, the 
plaintiff must show that the landlord failed to provide, or interfered with 
the provision of, certain essential services enumerated in the statute.67 
These services must be, by the terms of the statute, necessary to the 
proper or customary use of the premises. 68 The failure by the landlord to 
provide the services must be willful or intentional. 69 All of these tests set 
out in the statute require the determination of factual issues such as 
whether the services not provided were substantial enough to cause the 
requisite injury, and whether the landlord's failure to provide services 
was willful or intentional. The determination of factual issues is not 
appropriate outside an adversary context. 70 The building code violations 
alleged in this case did not appear to be substantial.H Furthermore, the 
violations alleged may have been resolved by the Court's decision on the 
sanitary code issue. 72 The Court was correct not to decide the question in 
this case where the factual issues were not developed by both parties. 
63 King v. G & M Realty Corp., 373 Mass. 658, 663-64, 370 N.E.2d 413, 416-17 (1977); 
Crowell v. McCaffrey, 377 Mass. 443, 445-48, 386 N.E.2d 1256, 1258-60(1980). 
64 King v. G & M Realty Corp., 373 Mass. 658, 664, 370 N.E.2d 413, 416-17 (1977). 
65 In King, the Court held that a tenant at sufferance could sue a landlord in tort for 
injuries sustained due to the landlord's negligent maintenance of the premises. /d. at 663-64, 
370 N.E.2d at 416-17. The Supreme Judicial Court, in Crowell, held that a tenant could sue 
the landlord in tort for injuries sustained from defects on the premises which resulted from 
the landlord's breach of the implied warranty of habitability. 377 Mass. 443, 457, 386 N .E.2d 
1256, 1261 (1979). 
66 390 Mass. at 635, 457 N.E.2d at 633. 
67 ld. 
68 See G.L. c. 186, § 14. 
69 Id. 
70 390 Mass. at 633, 457 N.E.2d at 631. 
71 Defective light switches, while causing inconvenience, may not deprive a tenant of 
essential services to which the remedy under G.L. c. 186, § 14is addressed. See 390 Mass. at 
635, 457 N.E.2d at 633. 
72 390 Mass. at 634-35, 457 N.E.2d at 632. 
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Even though it did not decide the issue, the Guerrier Court did give 
some guidance regarding the right of tenants at sufferance to enforce the 
building code through chapter 186, section 14. 73 The Court suggested that 
the factors it considered in deciding the issue of whether tenants at 
sufferance may sue landlords to enforce provisions of the sanitary code 
under section 127H are equally "appropriate" in deciding whether ten-
ants at sufferance have rights under section 14 of chapter 186 to enforce 
the building code. 74 This statement indicates that tenants at sufferance 
may be granted at least some rights under this statute, given its broad 
language and the policy goal of preserving habitable housing. 75 If the 
Court applies its dicta in the landlord-tenant tort liability cases and elimi-
nates common law concepts of status as prerequisites to recovery in the 
enforcement area, then the Court may well give the tenant at sufferance 
the right to enforce building code violations under section 14. 
The Guerrier decision has two implications of which the practitioner 
should be aware. First, the practitioner defending a residential landlord 
against an action by a tenant to enforce the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity can no longer rely on the defense that the tenant is a tenant at 
sufferance and, as such, has no right to maintain an action. Conversely, 
practitioners representing tenants inhabiting premises afflicted with viola-
tions of the implied warranty need not hesitate to bring legal action against 
the landlord on behalf of th~ tenant simply because the tenant is a tenant 
at sufferance. The Court appears ready to expand the rights of tenants at 
sufferance and enhance the duties owed tenants at sufferance by landlords 
when an appropriate case arises in an adversarial context. 
Whether the tenant at sufferance's right to quiet enjoyment of the 
premises under section 14 is equal to her rights under the implied war-
ranty of habitability enforceable through chapter 111, section 127H is left 
unanswered in Guerrier. A decision of a single judge of the Appeals Court 
has indicated that the rights of tenants at sufferance to quiet enjoyment 
may be less than the rights of other tenants. 76 If the Supreme Judicial 
Court decides to differentiate between the rights of tenants at sufferance 
to quiet enjoyment and the rights of other classes of tenants, the Court, 
like the single judge of the Appeals Court in Harris v. H.J. Davis Devel-
opment Corp., may require that the tenant at sufferance show more 
substantial interference with the right to quiet enjoyment before relief will 
73 Id. at 635, 457 N.E.2d at 633. 
74 G.L. c. 186, § 14. 
75 See Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 100-01, 431 N.E.2d 556, 565 (1982); Boston 
Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 192, 293 N.E.2d 831, 839 (1973); 
Angevine & Taube, Enforcement of Public Health Laws -Some New Techniques, 52 MASS 
L.Q. 205, 206 (1%7). 
76 See Harris v. H.J. Davis Development Corp., Mass. App. Ct., No. 82-0082-CV, 1. See 
also G.L. c. 186, § 14, supra note 31. 
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be granted under section 14.77 Since factual determinations must be made 
to decide section 14 claims, such an approach may be difficult for courts 
to apply. Establishing criteria for distingishing between the claims of 
different categories of tenants may involve the problems encountered by 
courts in the tort area. At the very least, the tenant at sufferance would 
probably be entitled to use section 14 to hold a landlord liable for willful or 
intentional interference with the quiet enjoyment of any residential prem-
ises occupied by the tenant. 78 To allow the landlord to interfere with the 
tenant at sufferance's occupancy to such a degree would emasculate the 
statutory right of the tenant to be subject to eviction only through judicial 
process. 79 
Brown v. Guerrier establishes that landlords are obligated to maintain 
residential properties in compliance with the state sanitary code for all 
occupants whose entry was lawful. 80 By making it possible for all occup-
ants, regardless of their status, to enforce the state sanitary code, the 
purpose of the statute to serve the public interest by preserving and 
rehabiliMiting the state's private housing stock is furthered. The next 
logical movement in this area of landlord-tenant relations will be in the 
area of rights of tenants at sufferance under the building code. In reaching 
that issue, the Court will either continue its established pattern of 
eliminating status concepts from the law of landlord-tenant, as it has done 
in the area of the landlord-tenant tort liability, 81 or the Court will seek to 
maintain some differentiation between the rights of different types of 
tenants to the quiet enjoyment of the premises. The Court is most likely to 
follow the recent trend of expanding the rights of all tenants in matters 
regarding the condition of the leased premises and to grant tenants at 
sufferance the right to enforce the state building code. 
§ 6.2. Tenants' Rights - Multiple Damages for Improper Retention of 
Security Deposits.* For more than a decad_e, the Massachusetts Legisla-
77 Harris at 1. 
78 I d. at 2. The Appeals Court actually said: "As the occupants have no entitlement under 
any contract or lease and little promise of entitlement as tenants at will, it appears the owner 
owes them something less than the undisturbed possession which the Housing Court's order 
could be read as requiring. On the other hand the owner cannot make life so unbearable for 
the plaintiffs that the owner has constructively evicted them." Id. at 1-2. The Court is 
unlikely to use "constructive eviction" as the test for determining whether the landlord has 
committed a violation of section 14 because the Court has announced its disapproval ofthe 
doctrine of constructive eviction in Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 
184, 199-200, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843. 
79 G.L. c. 186, § 14 provides in pertinent part that "[A]ny lessor or landlord ... who 
attempts to regain possession of premises by force without benefit of judicial process, shall 
be punished . . . . " 
80 390 Mass. at 634, 457 N.E.2d at 632. 
81 See, e.g., king v. G & M Realty Corp., 373 Mass. 658, 370 N.E.2d 413 (1983). 
* Susanna C. Burgett, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
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ture has regulated the use of security deposits, 1 evidencing a concern for 
one of the problems resulting from the inequality of bargaining positions 
between landlords and tenants. 2 Security deposits are a legitimate and 
perhaps necessary means by which landlords can protect their interest in 
leased premises.3 These deposits, however, may hinder the efforts of 
tenants, particularly low-income tenants, to obtain housing and to be 
treated fairly when leaving that housing. 4 
In 1969, the Legislature set the maximum allowable security deposit as 
an amount equivalent to two months' rent. 5 This security deposit law, 
chapter 186, section 15B of the General Laws, has undergone substantial 
amendment since 1969.6 Presently, the use of security deposits is, in 
almost all respects, strictly regulated. 7 In order to foster compliance with 
section 15B, the statute authorizes courts to award tenants treble damages 
for a violation by their landlords of specified provisions. 8 One such provi-
sion requires landlords to return security deposits within 30 days after 
termination of the tenancy. 9 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court, in Mellor v. 
§ 6.2. 1 See G.L. c. 186, § 15B. Section 15B has been amended several times since its 
enactment. See infra note 6. 
2 See Goes v. Feldman, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 84, 91, 391 N.E.2d 943, 947 (1979). 
3 See Blumberg & Robbins, Beyond ULTRA: A Program for Achieving Real Tenant 
Goals, 11 HARV. C.L.-C.L.L. REv. I, 18-19 & n.92 (1976). 
4 ld. 
5 See G.L. c. 186, § 15B. 
6 See Acts of 1970, c.666, § I; Acts of 1972, c. 639, § I; Acts of 1973, c. 430, § 11; Acts of 
1975, c. 154; Acts of 1977, c. 979, § I; Acts of 1978, c. 553, § 2; Acts of 1981, c. 82; Acts of 
1983, c. 695. For an explanation of the changes made by these amendments, see the editorial 
note following Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 186, § 15B (West 1981). 
7 See Schwartz,Property and Conveyancing, 1978ANN. SuRv. MASS. LAW. 1.1, at 3. For 
a detailed explanation of the provisions in section 15B, see Schwartz,supra at 3-10. See also 
Hampshire Village Assoc. v. District Court of Hampshire, 381 Mass. 148, 151-53, 408 
N.E.2d 830, 832-33, cert. denied sub nom. Ruhlander v. District Court of Hampshire, 449 
u.s. 1062 (1980). 
8 See G.L. c. i86, § 15B(7) which provides: 
If the lessor or his agent fails to comply with clauses (a), (d), or (e) of subsection 6, the 
tenant shall be awarded damages in an amount equal to three times the amount of 
such security deposit or balance thereof to which the tenant is entitled plus interest at 
the rate of five per cent from the date when such payment became due, together with 
court costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 
9 G.L. c. 186, § 15B(6) provides in pertinent part: 
The lessor shall forfeit his right to retain any portion of the security deposit for any 
reason, or, in any action by a tenant to recover a security deposit, to counterclaim for 
any damage to the premises if he: . . . 
(e) fails to return to the tenant the security deposit or balance thereof to which the 
tenant is entitled after deducting therefrom any sums in accordance with the provi-
sions of this section, together with any interest thereon, within thirty days after 
termination of the tenancy. 
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Berman, 10 resolved two issues concerning the scope of a landlord's liabil-
ity for improperly withholding a security deposit. The Court held that a 
landlord who improperly fails to return al1 or part of a ~ecurity deposit is 
liable for treble damages regardless of his or her good fWth. 11 In addition, 
the Court ruled that the trial court in Mellor did not have the authority to 
award attorney's fees incurred in defending an appeal of section 15B 
without such a direction by the Appeals Court. 12 
The plaintiffs in Mellor leased residential property from the defendant 
and gave her a $500 security deposit. 13 After the tenants vacated the 
premises upon expiration of their lease, the lessor inspected the premises, 
noted damage which she believed was caused by the tenants, and decided 
that she was entitled to keep the security deposit. 14 The lessor then sent a 
letter to the tenants stating what damage had been done and the cost of 
repairs, which she estimated at $580.49. 15 
Disputing the issue of damages, the tenants brought suit in Housing 
Court seeking treble damages for the improper retention of their security 
deposit. The Housing Court calculated the damage caused by the tenants 
to be $311.44Y Because the tenants were entitled to a balance of$213.56, 
the judge awarded treble damages in the amount of$640.68, plus interest, 
costs, and attorney's fees. 18 On appeal, the Appeals Co~rt affi.rmed. 19 The 
10 390 Mass. 275, 454 N.E.2d 907 (1983). 
11 Id. at 283, 454 N.E.2d at 913. 
12 Id. at 284, 454 N.E.2d at 913. 
13 Id. at 276, 454 N.E.2d at 909. 
14 ld. 
15 Id. The Court also noted that section 15B(4)(iii) requires that a lessor deducting from a 
security deposit on account of damage provide the tenant with a detajied, itemized list of the 
damage and of the repairs necessary to correct the damage, and with written evidence of the 
actual or estimated cost of repairs, such as receipts or estimates. Id. at 276-77 n.4, 454 
N.E.2d at 909 n.4. The Court added that although the lessor itemiztjd the damages, she did 
not comply fully with the requirements in section 15B(4)(iii). Id'. Despite the tenant's 
contention that the lessor was not entitled to retain the security deposit because of her 
failure to comply with this subsection, the Court stated that the matter was not before it 
since the issue had not been raised before the Appeals Court. Id. 
16 390 Mass. at 277, 454 N.E.2d at 909-10. 
17 Id. at 277, 454 N.E.2d at 910. 
18 ld. Initially, the judge awarded double damages. Id. The tenants moved for treble 
damages based on the Appeals Court's ruling in Friedman v. Costello, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 
931,412 N.E.2d 1285 (1980). In Friedman, the Appeals Court ruled:that the amendment of 
section 15B(7) by the Acts of 1977, c. 979, increasing recovery from double to treble 
damages, applied to any security deposit held on or after September 1, 1978. 10 Mass. App. 
at 931, 412 N.E. 2d at 1286. Agreeing with the tenant's argument, t;he trial court in Mellor 
amended the judgment and awarded treble damages in the amount ~f $640.68. 390 Mass. at 
277, 454 N.E.2d at 910. . 
19 Mellor v. Berman, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 983, 984, 432 N.E.2d 542, 543 (1982). On appeal, 
the lessor challenged the constitutionality of the amendment increasing damages to treble 
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tenants then filed a motion requesting attorney's fees and costs arising 
from appeal.20 The lessor moved for relief from judgment, asserting that a 
finding of bad faith was required for an award of multiple damages. 21 The 
Supreme Judicial Court ordered direct review of the case. 22 
The first issue addressed by the Supreme Judicial Court was whether a 
showing of bad faith is required to impose treble damages. 23 The Court 
initially examined the language of section 15B and found it to be unam-
biguous.24 According to the Court, the plain language of subsection 7 
indicated that a finding of bad faith is not a requirement for the award of 
treble damages. 25 
The Court then turned to the lessor's primary contention that precedent 
called into question this reading of subsection 7. 26 The lessors in Mellor 
argued that language in a case decided previously by the Supreme Judicial 
Court, McGrath v. Mishara ,27 suggested that the award of multiple dam-
ages was contingent on a finding of bad faith. 28 In McGrath, the Mellor 
Court conceded, the Supreme Judicial Court had stated that "[a]t a 
minimum, a landlord must have a reasonable good faith belief that it is 
entitled to [the] amount deducted .... " 29 The Mellor Court noted, 
however, that the McGrath Court had found that the lessor had acted in 
bad faith by retaining part of the security deposit improperly. 30 Therefore, 
damages. /d. at 984, 432 N.E.2d at 542-43. She contended that the amendment had a 
retroactive effect. /d. The Appeals Court found that claim without merit because the 
defendant's obligation to return the security deposit arose ten months after the effective date 
of the amendment. /d. 
20 390 Mass. at 278, 454 N.E.2d at 910. 
21 /d. 
22 /d. 
23 /d. at 278-79, 454 N.E.2d at 910-11. 
24 /d. at 279, 454 N .E.2d at 911. The text of subsection 7 appears supra note 8. 
25 /d. at 280, 454 N.E.2d at 911. 
26 /d. 
27 386 Mass. 74, 434 N.E.2d 1215 (1982). In McGrath, the tenants alleged that their 
landlord had made improper deductions from their security deposit for unpaid rent in 
violation of several statutes and an ordinance, including G.L. c. 186, § 15B. /d. at 78-83, 434 
N.E.2d at 1219-21. The Court ruled in favor of the tenants on the section 15B issue. /d. at 80, 
434 N.E.2d at 1220. Addressing the issue of whether the landlord's good faith was a defense 
under this section, the Court explained that the problem with this argument was the trial 
judge's finding that "the landlord knew or should have known that rent was not in fact due." 
/d. at 80, 434 N.E.2d at 1219-20. In finding bad faith on the part of the landlord, however, the 
McGrath Court did not reach the issue of whether good faith was a defense to section 15B. 
/d. at 79-80, 434 N.E.2d at 1219-20. 
28 390 Mass. at 280, 454 N.E.2d at 911-12. 
29 /d. at 280, 454 N.E.2d at 911-12, (quoting McGrath, 386 Mass. at 80, 434 N.E.2d at 
1219). 
30 390 Mass. at 281, 454 N .E.2d at 912. 
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according to the Court, the language in McGrath suggesting a bad faith 
requirement was merely dictum.31 
The Mellor Court then examined the legislative history of section 15B 
for evidence that good faith was not a defense to the · imposition of 
multiple damages. 32 The Court first commented that the g~neral purpose 
and use of multiple damages was to deter conduct that the Legislature 
found particularly reprehensible.33 The multiple damagels provision in 
section 15B, the Court noted, was aimed at encouraging sUits by tenants 
who might not otherwise litigate, especially if the legal jexpense could 
exceed the amount wrongfully retained by the lessor. 34 The Court then 
observed that in 1970, the Legislature enacted a double damage provision 
for the "wilful" and improper retention of a tenant's security deposit.35 In 
1972, however, the Legislature deleted the requirement of a "wilful" 
violation.36 Although proposals had subsequently come before the Legis-
lature to re-enact a bad faith requirement in section 15B, tqe Mellor Court 
observed, the Legislature had failed to adopt any of these proposals. 37 In 
addition, the Court asserted, an examination of multiple;damage provi-
sions in other statutes indicated that the Legislature knew how to include 
a bad faith requirement when it wanted to do so.38 F~nding that the 
statute's language and legislative history were both clear on the issue, the 
Court then concluded that subsection 7 of section 15B could not be 
construed as containing a bad faith requirement. 39 
The Mellor Court next briefly discussed whether a trial court could 
award costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending an appeal of section 
15B where the Appeals Court had not ordered such an awatd. 40 Recogniz-
ing that section 15B(7) authorizes trial judges to award !attorney's fees 
incurred at trial, the Court noted that section 15B makes no mention of a 
trial court's awarding attorney's fees related to an appeal. 41 The Court 
stated that ih a previous case, Darmetko v. Boston Hous .. Auth. ,42 it had 
authorized the trial judge on remand to award attorney's f¢es arising from 
31 Jd. 
32 Id. at 281-83, 454 N.E.2d at 912-13. 
33 Id. at 281-82, 454 N.E.2d at 912. 
34 Id. at 282, 454 N.E.2d at 912. 
35 Id. at 282, 454 N.E.2d at 912. 
36 Jd. 
37 ld. at 282, 454 N.E.2d at 913. The proposed amendments to section 15B containing a 
wilfulness requirement and cited by the Mellor Court may be found at 1972 House Doc. Nos. 
248, 1676 and 3122. 
38 Jd. at 282-83 n.ll, 454 N.E.2d at 913 n.11. 
39 Id. at 283, 454 N.E.2d at 913. 
40 ld. at 283-84, 454 N.E.2d at 913-14. 
41 Jd. at 283, 454 N.E.2d at 913. 
42 378 Mass. 758, 393 N.E.2d 395 (1979). 
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the appeal. 43 By contrast, the Court explained, the Appeals Court in 
Mellor did not make such a direction to the trial court. 44 The Court stated 
that a litigant must bear the burden of the expenses of litigation unless 
relieved from paying them by statute or by court order. 45 
The Mellor Court's reasoning on both issues examined is correct. In 
reaching the conclusion that awarding multiple damages is not contingent 
on a finding of bad faith, the Court properly analyzed both the language 
and the legislative history of section 15B. The statute contains no lan-
guage concerning the intent or motivation of the lessor, thus indicating 
that intent is irrelevant. 47 Furthermore, there is a lack of positive evidence 
in the legislative history of section 15B of a bad faith requirement. 48 
Indeed, the legislative history specifically controverts that possibility .49 
As the Mellor Court observed, the Legislature deleted a requirement 
similar to bad faith, that of wilfulness, for the imposition of multiple 
damages and subsequently failed to enact proposals containing such a 
requirement. 50 
By suggesting in dictum that good faith may be a defense to multiple 
damages, the McGrath Court was apparently speaking in generalities, 
without undertaking a close examination of the language and legislative 
history of section 15B.51 Recognizing McGrath's language as dictum, the 
Mellor Court accorded only slight precedential value to McGrath and 
instead directly analyzed the plain language and legislative history of 
section 15B.52 This examination demonstrated that neither the statute's 
wording nor its legislative history indicated that the statute did or should 
contain a bad faith requirement. 53 
The issue in Mellor of a trial court's power to award attorney's fees 
incurred on appeal was properly and straightforwardly handled by the 
Court. A trial court may award attorney's fees incurred on appeal only 
43 390 Mass. at 283, 454 N.E.2d at 913. 
44 Id. at 284, 454 N.E.2d at 913. 
45 /d. 
46 ld. 
47 See G.L. c. 186, § 15B(7), supra note 8. 
48 See 390 Mass. at 282-83 & n.ll, 454 N.E.2d at 912-13 & n.11. 
49 ld. 
50 Jd. at 282, 454 N.E.2d at 912-13. 
51 The McGrath decision did not examine the legislative history of section 15B. See 386 
Mass. at 79-80, 434 N.E.2d at 1219-20. By contrast, the Mellor opinion relied heavily on the 
statute's legislative history in concluding that section 15B did not contain a bad faith 
requirement. See 390 Mass. at 282-83, 454 N.E.2d at 912-13. In undertaking this examina-
tion, the Mellor Court acknowledged assistance from a brief filed by the Massachusetts 
Tenants Organization as amicus curiae concerning the legislative history of section 15B. See 
390 Mass. at 282-83 n.ll, 454 N.E.2d at 913 n.11. 
52 See 390 Mass. at 278-83, 454 N.E.2d at 910.13. 
53 ld. 
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when given this authority by statute or by an appellate court.54 Because 
neither section 15B nor the Appeals Court in Mellor granted the trial court 
this authority, the trial court lacked the power to award attorney's fees 
other than those incurred at trial. 55 
The Mellor Court's construction of section 15B(7) is likely to have 
adverse consequences for landlords in Massachusetts. When withholding 
any portion of a security deposit, a landlord must totally comply with 
section 15B's requirements or else risk paying treble damages.56 If a 
landlord, such as the one in Mellor, properly retains a portion of a security 
deposit but is incorrect as to the exact amount to which he or she is 
entitled, the landlord may have to pay damages that are greater than the 
amount of the security deposit withheld. The risk and burden of paying 
treble damages may be greater than the risk and burden of absorbing the 
costs of damage or unpaid rent. Faced with this prospect as a result of a 
possibly innocent miscalculation, a landlord may be impelled to withhold 
less than he or she believes is due. 
Despite the seeming harshness of imposing multiple damages regardless 
of good faith, there are at least two justifications for such a policy. First, 
under section 15B( 4)(iii), a landlord is required to furnish a list of itemized 
damages along with written evidence of the actual or estimated costs of 
repair.57 With such written evidence of the costs of repair, a landlord's 
assessment of damage should generally be accurate. 58 For this reason, a 
landlord who complies with section 15B( 4)(iii) will not ordinarily be sub-
ject to penalty in the form of treble damages. 
The second justification for a multiple damages provision operative 
regardless of good faith is the Legislature's recognition of the unequal 
bargaining positions of landlords and tenants. 59 To equalize their relative 
positions, the Legislature has placed a heavy procedural and monetary 
burden on landlords with the adoption of section 15B. Landlords must 
now comply strictly with section 15B and be cautious when deducting any 
money from a security deposit or else risk paying treble damages. More-
over, section 15B provides tenants with an incentive to protect their 
54 !d. at 284, 454 N.E.2d at 913. 
55 /d. at 283-84, 454 N.E.2d at 913. 
56 See G.L. c. 186, § 15B(7). 
57 G.L. c. 186, § 15B(4)(iii). The pertinent portion of this subsection provides: 
In the case of such damage, the lessor shall provide to the tenant within such thirty 
days an itemized list of damages, sworn to by the lessor or his agent under pains and 
penalties of peJjury, itemizing in precise detail the nature of the damage and of the 
repairs necessary to correct such damage, and written evidence, such as estimates, 
bills, invoices or receipts, indicating the actual or estimated cost thereof. 
58 The lessor in Mellor, for example,.failed to include in her letter to the tenants written 
evidence of the cost of repairs as required by section 15B( 4)(iii). 390 Mass. at 276-77 n.4, 454 
N.E.2d at 909 n.4. 
59 See Goes v. Feldman, 8 Mass. App. Ct. at 91, 391 N.E.2d at 947. 
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rights. Prior to the enactment of section 15B, tenants had little motivation 
to litigate when their legal expenses might be greater than a judgment 
which consists of a simple return of the money wrongfully withheld. 60 
In conclusion, the Supreme Judicial Court in Mellor v. Berman ruled 
that good faith is not a defense to the imposition of multiple damages 
authorized under chapter 186, section 15B of the Genend Laws. The 
Mellor decision may operate harshly against landlords in limited circum-
stances. Placing this heavier burden on landlords in handling security 
deposits, however, is justified as an attempt to equalize the bargaining 
positions of landlords and tenants. 
§ 6.3. Rights of Re-Entry- Duration of Condition- Assignability-
Alienability of Enforcement.* At common law, the right of re-entry re-
tained by a grantor who conveys in fee subject to conditions subsequent 
was not only inalienable inter vivos but was also destroyed by an at-
tempted conveyance.' This rule of law was consistently applied by Mas-
sachusetts courts for over 120 years. 2 In 1954, the Legislature passed a 
statute which regulated interests and estates by amending chapter 184A of 
the General Laws. 3 The statute was designed to eliminate the disparity in 
60 See id. 
* Erica Rosenberg, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 6.3. 1 See, e.g., Rice v. Boston and Worcester Railroad, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 141 
(1866); Guild v. Richards, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 309, 318 (1860)(rights of entry non-assignable). 
Most jurisdictions recognize that after the grantor's death, the right of re-entry may be 
asserted by heirs. Massachusetts, however, had applied the rule of inalienability to at-
tempted transfers. 
2 See, e.g., Rice v. Boston & Worcester Railroad, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 141 (1866). 
3 G.L.c. 184A, §§ 1-3 read as follows: 
§ 1 In applying the rule against perpetuities to an interest in real or personal property 
limited to take effect at or after the termination of one or more life estates in, or lives 
of, persons in being when the period of said rule commences to run, the validity of the 
interest shall be determined on the basis of facts existing at the termination of such 
one or more life estates or lives. In this section an interest which must terminate not 
later than the death of one or more persons is a "life estate" even though it may 
terminate at an earlier time. 
§ 2 If an interest in real or personal property would violate the rule against per-
petuities as modified by section one because such interest is contingent upon any 
person attaining or failing to attain an age in excess of twenty-one, the age con-
tingency shall be reduced to twenty-one as to all persons subject to the same age 
contingency. 
§ 3 A fee simple determinable in land or a fee simple in land subject to a right of entry 
for condition broken shall become a fee simple absolute if the specified contingency 
does not occur within thirty years from the date when such fee simple determinable or 
such fee simple subject to a right of entry becomes possessory. If such contingency 
occurs within said thirty years the succeeding interest, which may be an interest in a 
person other than the person creating the interest or his heirs, shall become pos-
sessory or the right of entry exercisable notwithstanding the rule against perpetuities. 
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treatment between rights of entry and possibilities of re-entry, and 
executory interests. 4 Before the statute's enactment, executory interests 
were held void under the rule against perpetuities.5 Rights of entry and 
possibilities of reverter, on the other hand, were traditionally exempt 
from application of this rule.6 During the Survey year, in Oak's Oil 
Service, Inc. v. MBTA,1 the Appeals Court, construing chapter 184A, 
sections 1-3 for the first time, interpreted the statute as authorizing the 
creation of a right of entry for condition broken in a person other than the 
grantor. 8 
In Oak's Oil Service, the Boston and Maine Railroad (" B & M") had 
conveyed real estate adjoining its right of way in North Beverly to Heath 
Morse in January 1956.9 The land consisted of the North Beverly depot 
and parking lot and was subject to an express condition. 10 The conditional 
term required that Morse's heirs and assigns for one hundred years "shall 
provide to the grantor [B & M], its heir and assigns, for the accommoda-
tion of and use by said grantor, its successors, assigns and patrons" 
facilities to accommodate passengers in the station building and their cars 
in the parking lot. 11 The condition also provided for the right of ingress 
and egress over the premises without charge to the grantor, its succes-
sors, assigns and patrons. 12 The deed stipulated that B & M, its succes-
sors, and assigns should have a right of re-entry upon breach of the 
condition following notice, and allowed for termination if the grantor 
abandoned passenger service. 13 
In June of 1956, Morse conveyed the premises to the plaintiff, Oak's Oil 
Service, Inc. 14 Oak's Oil Service in tum leased and later sold a portion of 
the premises to the defendant, Amoco Oil. 15 In 1976, the railroad con-
veyed its premises by deed to the defendant Massachusetts Bay Transpor-
tation Authority ("MBTA"). 16 On one or more occasions between July, 
1977 and May, 1980 the MBTA notified the plaintiff that it was in breach 
of the deed's condition. 17 
4 See Oak's Oil Service v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, 15 Mass. App. 
Ct. 593, 597, 447 N.E.2d 27, 30 (1983). 
5 /d. at 597-98, 447 N.E.2d at 30. 
6 Id. at 598, 447 N.E.2d at 30. 
7 /d. at 593, 447 N.E.2d at 27. 
8 /d. at 598, 447 N.E.2d at 30. 







16 /d. at 594-95, 447 N.E.2d at 29. 
17 !d. at 595, 447 N.E.2d at 29. 
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In November, 1980 the MBTA, pursuant to the deed, recorded a cer-
tificate of entry for condition broken. 18 In response to the MBTA's action, 
the plaintiff brought suit in district court to remove the cloud on its title 
and joined Amoco Oil as a defendant. 19 Upon cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the judge held the certificate of entry null and void. 20 The judge 
rejected the MBTA's argument that because the deed contained the 
reserved right of entry and because the MBTA was B & M's successor, 
the MBTA held in fee simple the parcel conveyed to Morse in 1956.21 
Instead, the judge, relying on a line of cases which held that transfer 
extinguishes the right of re-entry, concluded that the right of entry in this 
case could not have been assigned. 22 The MBTA appealed. 23 
On appeal, the court concluded that the right of entry was assignable in 
light of chapter 184A, sections 1-3.24 According to the Appeals Court, the 
statute had two effects on the deed relative to the rule against per-
petuities25. First, according to the court, the statute changed the length of 
the terms of the condition;26 and, second, it validated the assignability of 
the right of entry for condition broken. 27 
In applying the statute, the court first shortened the length of the 
condition to thirty years. 28 The parties in this case intended to have the 
condition last one hundred years. 29 The first sentence of the statute 
provides that if a breach of the condition does not occur within thirty 
years of the time the estate becomes possessory, the fee shall become 
absolute.30 Thus, despite the intention of the parties to the original grant, 
the court held that the statute mandated that the right of entry would have 
expired if the condition were not broken by 1986.31 
Second, the court ruled that the statute established that the right of 
re-entry was alienable. The second sentence of the statute provides that 
18 !d. 
19 !d. 
20 !d. at 596, 447 N.E.2d at 29. 
21 !d. 
22 /d. For cases holding that inter vivos conveyance destroys the right of entry, see Dyer 
v. Siano, 298 Mass. 537, 11 N.E.2d 451 (1937); St. Paul's Church v. Attorney General, 164 
Mass. 188, 41 N.E. 231 (1895); Rice v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 414 
(1866). For cases holding rights of entry non-assignable, see Brown v. Independent Baptist 
Church of Woburn, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d 922 (1950); Guild v. Richards, 82 Mass. (16 
Gray) 309, 318 (1860). 
23 !d. 
24 !d. at 598, 447 N .E.2d at 29. 
25 !d. at 598, 447 N.E.2d at 30. 
26 See id. at 596-97, 447 N.E.2d at 30-31. 
27 See id. at 597-98, 447 N.E.2d at 30-31. 
28 !d. at 596, 447 N.E.2d at 29-30. 
29 /d. at 596, 447 N.E.2d at 29. 
30 !d. G.L. c. 184, § 3. 
31 !d. at 597, 447 N.E.2d at 30. 
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"[i]f such contingency occurs within said thirty years the succeeding 
interest, which may be an interest in a person other than the person 
creating the interest or his heirs, shall become possessory or the right of 
entry exercisable notwithstanding the rule against perpetuities. " 32 The 
Appeals Court ruled that the intended effect of this sentence was to 
validate executory interests33 such as those created by lartguage like that 
used in Institution for Savings in Roxbury v. Roxbury Rome for Aged 
Women. 34 In that case, the Supreme Judicial Court found an executory 
interest where the deed provided, "[t]o the Institution for Savings so long 
as it shall continue to exist, and then to the Old Ladies Home." 35 Accord-
ing to the Appeals Court, before the statute's enactment1 a provision of 
this sort would have been held void under the rule against perpetuities.36 
Rights of entry and possibilities of re-entry, on the other hand, were 
traditionally held exempt under the rule. 37 Because the statute limited the 
duration of executory interests to thirty years and allowed!enforcement of 
a condition by one other than the grantor, the Court noted, the statute 
effectively rendered right of entry and possibilities of re-entry indistin-
guishable in operation from executory interests created by analogous 
language. 38 
Finally, the court reasoned that although the statute d~d not explicitly 
address the question of alienability of rights of entry for 'conditions bro-
ken, it removed the underlying common law disability oni the creation of 
rights of entry in persons other than the grantor and his heirs, and 
destroyed the basis for the rule of non-alienability. 39 Consequently, if the 
parties intended to create a right of entry in a person other than the 
grantor, the court should give the intention effect. 40 
The Oak's Oil Service Court then turned to evaluate the. intention of the 
parties in the 1956 conveyance. 41 The deed stipulated that in the event of a 
breach, the "grantor, its successors and assigns" shall have the right of 
entry and the possibility of re-entry. 42 In analyzing the deed, the court 
concluded that the right of entry was not personal to the $rantor and that 
32 Id. (citing G.L. c. 184A § 3) (emphasis added by the Appeals Court). 
33 Id. at 597, 447 N.E.2d at 30. Executory interests are all future estates and interests 
other than reversions and remainders. 
34 244 Mass. 583, 139 N.E. 201 (1928). 
35 ld. 
36 Oak's Oil Service v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 597, 447 N.E.2d at 30. 
37 ld. 
38 Id. at 597-98, 447 N.E.2d at 30. 
39 Jd. at 599, 447 N.E.2d at 31. 
40 ld. 
41 ld. 
42 Id. at 599-600, 447 N.E.2d at 31. 
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the parties' intent was clear. 43 The right of entry in this case was therefore 
assignable. 44 
Based on the statute and the deed itself, the court reversed and re-
manded the case for further proceedings. 45 Because the court found that 
the right of entry was assignable, a new trial was necessary to determine 
whether the right was assigned, whether Amoco impaired the enforceabil-
ity of the right of entry, whether the condition was broken and whether 
passenger service was abandoned at any time.46 
The Appeals Court in Oak's Oil Service interpreted chapter 184A as 
limiting the duration of nof only executory interests but also conditions to 
both original and executory interests to thirty years. The court interpreted 
the statute as allowing the enforcement of a condition by one other than 
the original grantor. 47 The court therefore complied with the legislative 
intent to eradicate the disparity in treatment of rights of entry and pos-
sibilities of re-entry, vis a vis treatment of executory interests when it 
construed chapter 184A as validating certain executory interests as well 
as rights of re-entry. 48 With this interpretation, the court eliminated the 
common law rule of the inalienability of rights of re-entry upon failure of a 
condition subsequent. The elimination ofthis rule should serve both to aid 
draftsmen in fulfilling the intent of their clients and to bring predictability 
and uniformity to future interests law. 
43 /d. 
44 !d. at 600, 447 N.E.2d at 31. 
45 /d. The court also based its reasoning on two other considerations. Even if the 
condition of passenger service were terminated and right of entry lost, another possible 
source of obligation from the plaintiff to the defendant exists. /d. Chapter 160, section 128 
requires a railroad which has operated a station for five years to obtain Department of Public 
Utilities approval before abandoning the site. /d. If the North Beverly depot were within the 
statute, the real estate conveyed by Morse would be subject to a servitude imposed by law. 
/d. at 600, 447 N.E.2d at 32. The parties' private agreement can not divest the railroad of its 
statutory obligations. !d. at 600-01, 447 N.E.2d at 32. Such an easement could be passed on 
to a successor even if the latter were not subject to chapter 160, section 128. !d. at 601, 447 
N.E.2d at 32. 
The court also noted that in addition to the statute, the language of the deed itself may 
have effectively created an easement, or covenant that runs with the land. !d. According to 
the court, the language of the deed imposed obligations on Morse and his successors. /d. 
With respect to the maintenance of the depot and the parking facilities, the obligations 
imposed on Morse were intended for the benefit of B & M's railroad. /d. The obligations 
therefore ran as an appurtenance to those lands. /d. Because the private agreement, rather 
than the statute, stipulated that the easement would be limited to one hundred years from the 
time of the agreement, the duration would be limited to one hundred years from January, 
1956. !d. 
46 /d. at 600, 447 N .E.2d at 31. 
47 See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text. 
48 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
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§ 6.4. Refusal to Accept Title - Undisclosed Encumbrances - Private 
Restrictions Incorporating Public Law.* Nearly all jurisdictions recognize 
the principle that a prospective purchaser is justified in refusing to take 
title to property if it appears that there are undisclosed restrictions in the 
title which would hamper the purchaser's unrestricted usj! of the prop-
erty. 1 Several jurisdictions, however, make an exception 1o this general 
rule for private restrictions that impose a limitation which is no greater 
than the limitations already imposed by public statutes or ordinances on 
the use of the land. 2 These courts reason that such restrictions, even 
though unknown to a prospective purchaser, are not encumbrances on the 
title and would not justify the purchaser's rejection of the 1conveyance.3 
Massachusetts is among the jurisdictions which have cdnsistently fol-
lowed the general rule without exception. 4 Thus, the Massachusetts 
courts have held that a purchaser may refuse to accept a title which is 
restricted by a previously undisclosed encumbrance.5 Th~ position was 
reaffirmed during the Survey year by the Massachusetts A~peals Court in 
Coons v. Carstensen. 6 The court in Coons also addressed fdr the first time 
the question of whether to carve an exception for a use restriction which 
is the substantial equivalent of a restriction imposed by public law. 7 While 
refusing to find on the facts before the court that the restrict(ion was not an 
encumbrance, the Coons court indicated its willingness to 1adopt such an 
exception in an appropriate case. 8 
In Coons, the Appeals Court considered whether an owner of a parcel 
of land, which was subject to a restrictive agreement between the owner 
and a land conservation trust, could deliver good and clear necord title to a 
* Marguerite Dorn, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 6.4. 1 See,e.g., George v. Colvin, 98Cal. App. 2d 57, 219P.2d64(1950); Wheelerv. 
Sullivan, 90 Fla. 711, 106 So. 876 (1925); Stauss v. Kober, 51 So.2d 121 (La. Ct. App. 1951); 
Isaacs v. Schmuck, 245 N.Y. 77, 156 N .E. 621 (1927); Lasker v. Patrovsky, 264 Wis. 589, 60 
N. W.2d 336 (1953). 
2 See, e.g., Bull v. Burton, 227 N.Y. 101, 124 N.E. 111 (1919); Hall v. Risley, 188 Or. 69, 
213 P.2d 818 (1950). 
3 Some jurisdictions condition the exception on a finding that the possibility of a change in 
the statute is remote. See, e.g., Bull, 227 N.Y. at 107, 124 N .E. at 115. Other jurisdictions 
have recognized, however, that public law is not immutable and have th~refore limited the 
exception to those public land use regulations which will never change. S~e, e.g., Van Vliet 
& Place, Inc. v. Gaines, 249 N.Y. 106, 162 N.E. 600 (1928); Stauss v. Ko~er, 51 So.2d 121, 
123-24 (La. Ct. App. 1951). 
4 See, e.g., O'Meara v. Gleason, 246 Mass. 136, 140 N.E. 426 (1923). See generally Park, 
Real Estate Law §§ 951, 953 (2d ed. 1981) (discussing agreements concerning title to be 
conveyed and defects in the title in general). 
5 O'Meara v. Gleason, 246 Mass. 136, 139, 140 N.E. 426, 427 (1923). 
6 15 Mass. App. Ct. 431, 433, 446 N.E.2d 114, ll5 (1983). 
7 ld. at 433-36, 446 N.E.2d at 116-17. 
8 Jd. at 435-36, 446 N.E.2d at 116. 
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prospective purchaser.9 The court also considered whether such an 
agreement, which provided for the preservation of the wetland portion of 
the parcel in its natural state, constituted an encumbrance on the title, 
when public law imposed substantially similar limitations on the use of the 
land. 10 In a unanimous decision, 11 the court held that the restrictive 
agreement between the defendant owners and the land conservation trust 
constituted an encumbrance which prevented the defendants from con-
veying good and clear record title, despite the fact that the land was 
subject to a similar restriction under public law. 12 
According to the facts of Coons, the defendants, Warren and Evelyn 
Carstensen, owned several acres of land bordering the Sudbury River in 
Lincoln, Massachusetts. 13 This land was subject to the provisions of a 
Massachusetts statute which authorized the Commissioner of Natural 
Resources to acquire wetlands in Lincoln for the purpose of preserving 
the land in its natural state. 14 Consequently, in order to avoid eminent 
domain proceedings, the defendants executed a restrictive agreement 
with the Lincoln land conservation trust which limited the wetlands 
portion of their property to uses which would preserve the land in its 
natural state. 15 
Sixteen years after executing the restrictive agreement, the defendants 
entered into a purchase and sale agreement with the plaintiff, Nancy J. 
Coons, in which the defendants agreed to sell their land and the dwelling 
thereon for $400,000. 16 The agreement between the parties also provided 
that the defendants would convey a good and clear record and marketable 
title, free from encumbrances except for those specified in the agree-
mentY The encumbrances enumerated in the purchase and sale agree-
ment did not include the restrictive agreement with the Lincoln land 
conservation trust. 18 
Upon discovery of the restrictive agreement, the plaintiff declined to 
accept conveyance of the defendants' title and demanded return of her 
9 /d. at 431, 446 N.E.2d at 115. 
10 /d. 
11 Judge Kass wrote the decision in which Judges Grant and Rose concurred. 
12 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 436, 446 N.E.2d at 117. 
13 /d. at 431, 446 N.E.2d at 115. 
14 /d. at 431-32, 446 N.E.2d at 115. The land was subject to Acts of 1961, G.L. c. 579, § 3, 
which provided that the Commissioner of Natural Resources was authorized to acquire 
approximately I ,000 acres of flood plain marsh and land in the towns of Lincoln and 
Concord. !d. 
15 /d. at 432, 446 N.E.2d at 115. The agreement stated, in the language of the statute, that 
use of the land was limited "to uses which will, insofar as practicable, preserve the same in 
its natural state . . . . " I d. 
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$40,000 deposit. 19 The defendants refused to return the plaiqtiff's deposit, 
and the plaintiffsued.20 The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was 
granted by the trial court, 21 and the defendants appealed. 22 The Appeals 
Court affirmed, holding that the restrictive agreement with the Lincoln 
land conservation trust constituted an encumbrance which iprevented the 
defendants from conveying good and clear record title. 23 : 
In deciding the case, the Coons court relied on the widely' accepted rule 
that good and clear record title rests on the record alone, which must 
show an indefeasible unencumbered estate.24 Thus, according to the 
court, if extrinsic evidence beyond the record is required (o support the 
title, it may be marketable title, but it is not good and clear! record title.25 
Consequently, the court indicated that the defendants in thb present case 
were not capable of conveying to the plaintiffs a good and clear record 
title if, on the record alone, the title was encumbered by the restrictive 
agreement with the Lincoln land conservation trust. 26 
The Appeals Court determined that the agreement with the Lincoln 
land conservation trust did constitute an encumbrance on tl:ite defendants' 
titleP The Appeals Court based this determination on the general princi-
ple that all building and use restrictions constitute encumbrances. 28 The 
court cited several Massachusetts cases in support of this JI'Ule, including 
Gallison v. Downing 29 and Ayling v. Kramer. 30 In Gallison; the Supreme 
Judicial Court held that a private restriction providing th~t no buildings 
could be erected on the land within certain limitations constituted an 
encumbrance on the title. 31 Similarly, in Ayling, the Supreme Judicial 
Court construed as an encumbrance language in the title ~hich provided 
19 !d. 
20 !d. The plaintiffs commenced the present action in the Superior Court for Middlesex 
County. 
21 Id. at 432-33, 446 N.E.2d at 115. The motion for summary judgmertt was granted by 
Judge Mitchell of the superior court. 
22 Id. at 433, 446 N.E.2d at 115. 
23 !d. 
24 !d. 
25 !d. The court asserted that it is the word "record" which gives the Jllhrase "good and 
clear record title" a distinct meaning. ld. 
26 !d. Marketable title designates a title not necessarily perfect, or even good under the 
law, but so free from all fair and reasonable doubts "that a purchaser should be compelled to 
accept it in a suit for specific performance. Park, Real Estate Law, § 951 (2d ed. 1981). 
27 Coons, 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 433, 446 N.E.2d at 115. 
28 !d. The court also cited the language of G.L. c. 579, § 3, which its¢lf referred to the 
agreement as an "encumbrance." Jd.at 433, 446 N.E.2d at 116. 
29 244 Mass. 33, 138 N.E. 315 (1923). 
30 133 Mass. 12 (1882). 
31 244 Mass. at 36, 138 N.E. at 317. 
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that the land in question could be used or occupied for no purpose other 
than as a dwelling house. 32 
In Coons, the Appeals Court found that the agreement with the Lincoln 
land conservation trust substantially limited the manner in which the 
defendants could use their land.33 As such, the court held that the agree-
ment was a use restriction which constituted an encumbrance on the 
defendants' title.34 Consequently, the court held that, under the general 
rule, the defendants could not convey good and clear record title to the 
plaintiff. 35 
The Coons court then considered the defendants' contention that the 
restrictive agreement fell within an exception to the general rule govern-
ing encumbrances.36 The defendants asserted that a private restriction on 
use was not an encumbrance if the restriction imposed limitations· no 
greater than those imposed by public law. 37 Maintaining that two state 
statutes provided restrictions substantially similar to those contained in 
the restrictive agreement, the defendants argued that the agreement was, 
therefore, not an encumbrance.38 
The Appeals Court noted that several jurisdictions had adopted this 
exception to the general rule regarding encumbrances.39 Nevertheless, the 
court refused to apply this exception to the agreement in the present 
case. 40 The court pointed out that several jurisdictions have been unwill-
ing to adopt the exception, holding that private restrictions are not identi-
cal tp public use limitations. 41 Further, the court found that the facts in 
32 133 Mass. at 14. 
33 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 432, 446 N.E.2d at 115. 
34 /d. at 433, 446 N.E.2d at 115. 
35 /d. The facts in Coons do not indicate whether the restrictive agreement was actually 
recorded. This note assumes, however, that the court would not have held as it did were the 
agreement not recorded. 
36 /d. at 433, 446 N.E.2d at 116. 
37 !d. 
38 /d. at 435, 446 N.E.2d at 116-17. 
39 See, e.g., Bull v. Burton, 227 N.Y. 101, 124 N.E. 111 (1919). In Bull, the New York 
Court of Appeals held that a restriction limiting construction of buildings to brick or stone 
was so consistent with applicable ordinances that it did not constitute an encumbrance on 
the title. /d. at 106-107, 124 N .E. at 113. See also Hall v. Risley, 188 Or. 69, 213 P.2d 818 
(1950). In Hall, the Oregon Supreme Court held that a restriction requiring conformity with 
applicable zoning law was not an encumbrance because it did no more than incorporate 
public law. /d. at 87-88, 213 P.2d at 826. 
40 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 435, 446 N.E.2d at 116. 
41 /d. at 434, 446 N .E.2d at 116. See, e.g., George v. Colvin, 98 Cal. App. 2d 57, 219 P.2d 
64 (1950). In George, the California Court of Appeals held that a title to property was 
rendered unmarketable by restrictions on the type, size, location, and cost of buildings 
which were permitted thereon, and by a prohibition against keeping certain animals on the 
premises. Jd. at 62-63, 219 P.2d at 66-68. The George court held that these restrictions 
constituted encumbrances despite the fact that applicable ordinances imposed substantially 
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Coons were distinguishable from the other cases where t~e exception to 
the general rule had been applied.42 In those cases, the 4efendants had 
successfully contended that public laws had imposed restqctions on their 
land which incorporated the limitations provided by their own private 
restrictions. 43 In Coons, however, the Appeals Court determined that 
there was no congruence between the private restrictive agreement and 
either of the two state statutes upon which the defendants relied.44 
According to the court, the first statute cited by the defendants, the 
Wetlands Protection Act, established procedures and standards by which 
a local conservation commission could set forth the copditions under 
which wetlands could be altered. 45 The Wetlands Prote~tion Act, the 
court stated, did not create absolute use prohibitions on the defendants' 
land as did the limitations included in the private restricti~e agreement. 46 
In addition to the Wetlands Protection Act, the defendant~ also relied on 
the state statute under which the defendants had entered into the restric-
tive agreement with the Lincoln land conservation trust. 47 The defendants 
maintained that this statute imposed limitations on the use of their land 
equivalent to those provided by the private restrictive agreement. 48 The 
Coons court agreed that the statute had authorized the Commissioner of 
Natural Resources to acquire wetlands for protection purposes, but found 
that the statute imposed no restrictions on the manne~ in which the 
wetlands could be used.49 The court found that the spe~ific limitations 
under the restrictive agreement were far more onerous than those im-
posed by public law, and that therefore there was no i "parallelism" 
between the restrictive agreement and either of the two sitate statutes.50 
similar limitations on the land. Id. See also Wheeler v. Sullivan, 90 Fla. 711, 716-17, 106 So. 
876, 880 (1925); Barber Pure Milk Co. v. Goldin, 218 So.2d 409, 412-13 (Miss. 1969); Isaacs 
v. Schmuck, 245 N.Y. 77, 82-83, 86, 156 N.E. 621,622 (1927); Lasker v. Patrovsky, 264 Wis. 
589, 598-99, 60 N.W.2d 336, 341 (1953). 
42 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 434-35, 446 N.E.2d at 116-17. 
43 The court in Coons stated that all of the cases which it had citt1d as applying the 
exception only paid "lip service" to considering that exception. See s1pra note 39 for a 
discussion of Hall case. The court asserted that only one case, Hall v. Risl'p, 188 Or. 69,213 
P.2d 818 (1950), actually based its holding on application of the exception!. The Coons court 
maintained that Hall was distinguishable from the present case, beca~se the restriction 
imposed in that case was "indistinguishable" from public law. 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 434-35, 
446 N.E.2d at 116-17. 
44 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 435, 446 N.E.2d at 116. 
45 G.L. c. 131, § 40, as amended through Acts of 1978, c. 247 (also known as the Hatch 
Act). 
46 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 435, 446 N.E.2d at 117. 
47 G.L. c. 579, § 3. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. 1 
48 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 435, 446 N.E.2d at 117. 
49 Id. at 435-36, 446 N.E.2d at 117. 
50 /d. The court stated that when an owner of land agrees to convey godd and clear record 
title, he or she must do just that. The court asserted that ''it does not lie ih the mouth of the 
! 
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Consequently, the court held that, notwithstanding the fact that the man-
ner in which the defendants could use their land had been subject to 
regulation under two state statutes, the restrictive agreement nevertheless 
constituted an encumbrance on the defendants' titleY 
The Appeals Court's treatment of the restrictive agreement with the 
Lincoln land conservation trust was completely consistent with its past 
decisions on the issue of good and clear record title.52 The significance of 
the Coons decision, however, lies in the fact that the Massachusetts 
Appeals Court considered for the first time whether to follow several 
other jurisdictions in adopting an exception to the general rule governing 
encumbrances.53 The court in Coons suggested that, in a case where a 
private restriction did no more than incorporate existing public law, the 
court might be willing to hold that the private restriction was not an 
encumbrance on the title to the land.54 In such circumstances, the court 
stated, incorporating a specific public law which was subject to periodic 
amendment into a private restriction would not constitute an encumbr-
ance on the title. No encumbrance would exist, the court asserted, be-
cause the redundance in the two restrictions would be apparent on the 
record, and no reference to extrinsic materials would be required. 55 Con-
sequently, the Appeals Court's decision in Coons indicates that, in the 
proper circumstances, a Massachusetts court faced with this issue might 
adopt the exception to the general rule that a purchaser may refuse to take 
title to property which is restricted by undisclosed encumbrances and 
properly hold that a private restriction which is equivalent to the lim-
itations imposed by public law does not constitute an encumbrance on a 
title to land. 
§ 6.5. Sale of Real Estate - Caveat Emptor Reaffirmed.* Under the 
doctrine of caveat emptor, a seller is not liable to a buyer for the nondisc-
losure of material defects in an item purchased in an arms length transac-
seller ... to argue that the defect which clouds [the title] is oflittle practical consequence." 
/d. at 436, 446 N.E.2d at 117. 
51 /d. at 435, 446 N.E.2d at 117. The court stated, however, that in the proper circum-
stances it may be willing to apply the exception on which the defendants in Coons had relied. 
/d. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
52 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
53 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 435, 446 N.E.2d at 116. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying 
text. 
54 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 435, 446 N.E.2d at 116. The court stated that it would be willing to 
adopt such an exception in circumstances similar to those found in Hall v. Risley. See supra, 
note 39 for a discussion of the Hall case. 
55 /d. If the public law changes, however, so that it no longer overlaps with the private 
restriction, that restriction then would constitute an encumbrance on the title. 
* Marianne T. McCabe, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
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tion. 1 The doctrine of caveat emptor or "buyer beware" has traditionally 
imperilled not only the purchasers of consumer goods, but the buyers of 
real estate as well. 2 Unwary purchasers of real estate, therefore, have 
been barred from recovery for the nondisclosure of serious defects in 
property under this doctrine. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
affirmed its adherence to the traditional rule of caveat emptor in the sale 
of real estate in the leading case of Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank ,3 
decided in 1942. In Swinton, the Court refused to impose liability upon the 
seller of a house for not informing the purchaser that the house was 
infested with termites. 4 The Swinton Court noted that the law had not yet 
reached the point of imposing an "idealistic" duty upon the seller of real 
estate to inform the purchaser of material latent defects in the property. 5 
Since the time of the Swinton decision, significant changes have oc~ 
curred in the doctrine of caveat emptor in the area of the sale of goods. 
The old rule of caveat emptor in the sale of goods has given way to such 
new doctrines as the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability, 
and liability for defects in goods which cause personal injuries.6 In addi-
tion, the Massachusetts Legislature has enacted chapter 93A, the Con-
sumer Protection Act. 7 Chapter 93A makes it unlawful for one engaged in 
trade or business to commit an unfair or deceptive act. A seller violates 
chapter 93A by failing to disclose to a buyer a fact which might have 
influenced the buyer not to enter into the transaction. 8 The act imposes an 
affirmative duty upon sellers to disclose information to purchasers. 9 Such 
a duty is owed by one engaged in trade or business to purchasers of real 
estate as well as purchasers of goods and services. 10 This enactment of 
broad consumer protection legislation and the changes in the law regard-
ing the sale of goods, had led some practitioners to believe that the 
§ 6.5. 1 A good general discussion of the doctrine of caveat emptor can be found in 
Schwartz, Property and Conveyancing, 1968 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW,§§ 1.1-15, at 3-10 
[hereinafter cited as Schwartz]. 
2 ld. at 3. 
3 311 Mass. 677, 42 N.E.2d 808 (1942). 
4 Id. at 678, 42 N.E.2d at 809. 
5 ld. 
6 For an overview of changes in the law regarding the sale of goods see Calabresi and 
Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972). 
1 G.L. c. 93A. For a comprehensive discussion of the Consumer Protection Act, see 
generally Alperin and Chase, MASSACHUSETTS CONSUMER RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, MASSA-
CHUSETTS PRACTICE SERIES, Vols. 35, 36 (1979). See also, Rice, New Private Remedies for 
Consumers, 54 MAss. L.Q. 307 (1%9). 
8 See,e.g., Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688,693,322 N.E.2d 768,772-73 
(1975). 
9 ld. 
10 G.L. c. 93A § 1(b). See also Lantner v. Carson, 374 Mass. 606, 607, 373 N.E.2d 973, 
974 (1978). 
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Supreme Judicial Court would eventually overturn the doctrine of caveat 
emptor in the sale of real estate. 11 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed the 
caveat emptor doctrine as it pertains to the sale of real estate in the two 
related decisions of Nei v. Burley 12 and Nei v. Boston Survey Consul-
tants .13 In these two cases, the Court examined the remedies available to 
purchasers of a house lot who had not been informed by the broker, the 
seller, or the seller's surveyor that a seasonal stream ran through the lot 
and that the lot had other serious water problems. The Court held that the 
defendants did not commit fraud by failing to disclose the defects to the 
purchasers 14 and also that the plaintiffs could not recover under chapter 
93A. 15 Moreover, in the Burley decision, the Supreme Judicial Court 
determined that no right to a jury trial exists for actions brought under 
chapter 93A. 16 
InN ei v. Burley , the plaintiffs purchased a house lot from the defendant 
seller who had hired the defendant real estate broker to market the lot. 17 
Prior to the sale, the sellers of the lot employed a surveyor to perform high 
water and percolation tests on the land. 18 The tests revealed a water table 
so high that fill would be required before a septic system could be installed 
in accordance with the State Sanitary Code. 19 The surveyor also observed 
that a seasonal stream ran through the property in the springtime, but not 
during the fall dry season when the plaintiffs examined the property. 20 The 
surveyor prepared a report which noted the presence of water on the lot, 
but contained no interpretive data or conclusions, and forwarded it to the 
broker.21 The broker gave the report to the buyers without any explana-
tion of its contents. 22 Although one of the buyers later met the surveyor on 
the lot, the buyer failed to question the surveyor concerning the sig-
nificance of his report. 23 
In addition, prior to the Nei transaction, another buyer had signed a 
purchase and sale agreement for the lot, but had withdrawn from the sale 
11 See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 5. 
12 388 Mass. 307, 446 N.E.2d 674 (1983). 
13 388 Mass. 320, 446 N.E.2d 681 (1983). 
14 Nei v. Burley, 388 Mass. 307, 311, 446 N.E.2d 674, 677 (1983); Nei v. Boston Survey 
Consultants, 388 Mass. 320, 323, 446 N.E.2d 681, 683 (1983). 
15 Burley, 388 Mass. at 317, 446 N.E.2d at 680; Boston Survey, 388 Mass. at 325, 446 
N.E.2d at 684. 
16 Burley, 388 Mass. at 315, 446 N.E.2d at 679. 
17 Id. at 308, 446 N.E.2d at 674. 
18 See Boston Survey, 388 Mass. at 321, 446 N.E.2d at 682. 
19 Id. at 321, 446 N.E.2d at 683. 
2o Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Burley, 388 Mass. at 315, 446 N.E.2d at 679. 
23 Id. at 311, 446 N.E.2d at 677. 
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because a percolation test could not be conducted due to the presence of 
water on the lot. 24 Both the seller and the broker were aware of this fact 
but neither informed the subsequent purchasers. 25 De~' ite the water 
problems, the broker had listed the house lot in the ltiple Listing 
Service book ("MLS"), describing it as a "nice, woode building site. 
Tested, surveyed and ready to go." 26 The purchasers were shown a copy 
of the MLS sheet describing the property prior to the sale.27 
When the buyers attempted to build a home on the lot, the seasonal 
stream and the high water table forced them to truck in considerable 
amounts of land fill. The buyers sought recovery against the sellers and 
their broker charging fraud in connection with the purchas~ of real estate 
and a violation of chapter 93A.28 The buyers claimed d~mages in the 
amount of the increase in the cost of construction. 29 The'l. allegations of 
fraud were tried by a jury, and the judge allowed motions for a directed 
verdict at the close of the buyer's case on the fraud ~harges. 30 The 
allegation of a violation of chapter 93A was tried by a judge without a 
jury. 31 Judgment was entered for the defendants.32 
In addition to their suit against the sellers and broker, the same buyers 
commenced an action against the surveyor of the property who had been 
hired by the sellers in Nei v. Boston Survey Consultants ,33 ,again claiming 
fraud and a violation of chapter 93A. The trial court dismis~ed the charges 
against the defendant surveyor. 34 The Supreme Judicial Cohrt granted the 
buyers' motion for separate direct appellate review of b~th cases.35 
In Nei v. Burley, the Supreme Judicial Court reviewed ~our issues: 1) 
the sufficiency of the evidence of fraud; 2) the sufficiency qf the evidence 
as to the broker's violation of chapter 93A; 3) the denial of a jury trial by 
the court under chapter 93A; and 4) the determination that the sellers 
were not engaged in trade or commerce so as to be outside the ambit of 
chapter 93A.36 Turning first to the allegation offraud, the Court found that 
the failure of the sellers and the broker to disclose the infqrmation about 
the water on the property was mere nondisclosure and did I not constitute 
24 /d. at 316, 446 N.E.2d at 679. 
25 /d. at 308, 446 N.E.2d at 675. 
26 /d. at 311, 446 N.E.2d at 677. 
27 /d. at 315, 446 N.E.2d at 679. 





33 388 Mass. 320, 321, 446 N.E.2d 681, 681 (1983). 
34 /d. at 320, 446 N.E.2d at 681. 
35 Burley, 388 Mass. at 309, 446 N.E.2d at 676. 
36 !d. at 310, 446 N.E.2d at 676. 
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fraud. 37 The Court found that although the broker and the sellers knew of 
the existence of the seasonal stream, they were not under an obligation to 
disclose this to the buyer. 38 According to the Court, sellers and their 
brokers are not liable in fraud for failing to disclose latent defects known 
to them which materially alter the value of the property. 39 The Burley 
Court found that the sellers and the broker did not state half-truths or 
make partial disclosures, a situation which often requires full disclosure to 
avoid deception. 40 Because the parties dealt at arms length with each 
other, the Court noted, no fiduciary duty to speak arose between the 
sellers and the buyers or between the broker and the buyer. 41 Further-
more, the Court stated, the buyers could not show reliance upon the 
broker's statements in the MLS book to the effect that the lot was a 
tested, approved building lot because they had been given a report about 
the existence of the excessive waterY 
Addressing the second issue of whether the broker had violated chapter 
93A, the Consumer Protection Act, the Court found that no such violation 
had been shown. 43 The Court stated that the buyers made no claim that 
the broker knew or should have known that the test results raised a 
question of whether the lot was capable of sustaining a proper septic 
system without the introduction of a considerable amount of land fill. 44 
Moreover, according to the Court, the buyers had not shown that the 
broker had been unfair or deceptive by providing the test results while not 
explaining their significance.45 The Court also rejected the plaintiffs' ar-
gument that the broker violated chapter 93A by failing to inform them that 
a previous purchaser refused to purchase the lot due to water problems.46 
This nondisclosure, the Court noted, did not render the broker liable 
under chapter 93A because the broker was unaware of the culvert under 
the road which was a major source of the water problems on the lot. 47 
The next issue considered by the Court in Nei v. Burley was whether 
plaintiffs bringing actions under the Consumer Protection Act are entitled 
to a jury trial. 48 The Court stated that as originally enacted, chapter 93A 





41 Jd. at 311, 446 N.E.2d at 677. 
42 ld. 
43 Jd. at 316, 317, 446 N.E.2d at 679. 
44 Jd. at 315, 446 N.E.2d at 679. 
45 Id. at 316, 446 N.E.2d at 679. 
46 Jd. 
47 ld. 
48 Jd. at 311-15, 446 N.E.2d at 677-79. 
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equitable relief, such as an injunction. 49 The words ''in equiW,'' the Court 
observed, were struck from part of chapter 93A when law and equity were 
merged in 1978 under the new Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. 5° 
The Burley Court stated that it would not infer from the striking of the 
words "in equity" that the Legislature had thereby grante~ the right to a 
jury trial. 51 Noting the equitable relief available under the s~atute and the 
silence of the Legislature on this issue, the Burley Court concluded that a 
right to a jury trial is not available under chapter 93A.52 
The final issue in Nei v. Burley was whether the sellers of the lot could 
be liable under the Consumer Protection Act for nondis~losure. 53 The 
Court found that the sellers in Burley were not engage~ in trade or 
commerce in such a manner to subject them to liability tinder chapter 
93A. 54 The Court reasoned that in order for the sellers to be liable under 
chapter 93A the transaction must have taken place in a "business con-
text."55 In determining whether a business context exi~ts, the Court 
explained, the relevant factors are the nature of the tr4nsaction, the 
character of the parties involved, the activities in which the !parties partic-
ipated, and whether the transaction was motivated by business or per-
sonal reasons. 56 The Court noted that the sellers in Burley played a minor 
role in the sale of the lots, reserving to themselves only the !acceptance or 
rejection of the offers to purchase which the broker submitted to them. 57 
Moreover, the Court said, neither of the sellers devoted a*y appreciable 
time to the real estate and both were employed in other capacities. 58 
Although the Court found the issue a close one, it determined that the 
sellers in Burley were not engaged in a trade or commetce within the 
meaning of chapter 93A, and therefore could not be found liable under the 
Consumer Protection Act. 59 
49 /d. at 312, 446 N.E.2d at 677. 
50 /d. 
51 Id. at 312, 315, 446 N.E.2d at 677-79. 
52 /d. at 315,446 N.E.2d at 679. Traditionally, trial by jury has been allowed as a matter of 
right in "legal" cases but not allowed in "equitable" cases. See Montgom~ry and Wald, The 
Right To Trial By Jury in c. 93A Actions, 67 MAss. L. REv. 79, 80 (1982). 
53 388 Mass. at 317, 446 N.E.2d at 680. 
54 Id. at 318, 446 N.E.2d at 680. See G.L. c. 93A § 2. 
55 388 Mass. at 317, 446 N.E.2d at 680. 
56 Id. 
57 /d. at 317, 318, 446 N.E.2d at 680. 
58 One of the sellers, the husband, was employed full time as a fluid power engineer while 
the other seller was a housewife. The lot was part of a tract of land in Carlisle, which 
consisted of fourteen acres. The tract was conveyed to the sellers by a family member in 
1%5, with the understanding that the lots would only be sold to help p~~ the costs of the 
education of the sellers' children. They marketed the property through t e broker and did 
not devote any appreciable part of their time to real estate. /d. at 317-18, 4 N. E.2d at 680. wu . 
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Judge Abrams dissented in part from the Court's opinion.60 She argued 
that the Court should have determined that the sellers were in trade or 
commerce for purposes of the chapter 93A claim. 61 Judge Abrams rea-
soned that the sellers were actively engaged in conduct designed to 
enhance their profit from selling the land. 62 She pointed out that the sellers 
had the land surveyed and divided into lots by experts. 63 Furthermore, 
she noted, they had hired a broker to advertise and sell the land.64 
According to Judge Abrams, the sellers in Nei v. Burley were no different 
from an average developer who holds unimproved land.65 She argued that 
because the sellers had hired experts to assist them, they had expert 
knowledge equivalent to that of any professional selling real estate.66 The 
sellers, Judge Abrams concluded, treated their land as if it were a business 
venture and therefore should be within the scope of chapter 93A liabil-
ity. 67 
In the related case of Nei v. Boston Survey Consultants ,68 the Supreme 
Judicial Court upheld the dismissal by the lower court of charges that the 
surveyor who had been employed by the defendant seller in Nei v. Burley, 
engaged in fraud and violated chapter 93A by failing to disclose the 
existence of the seasonal stream and a high water table on the lot. 69 
Addressing the fraud claim, the Court determined that the surveyor had 
no duty to speak to the prospective buyers or to explain the significance of 
the soil report. 70 Moreover, the Court found, the buyers had not alleged 
that the surveyor stated half-truths or made partial disclosures or misrep-
resentations.1' Accordingly, the Court determined that the buyers had not 
made out a case of fraud. 72 
Turning to the chapter 93A count, the Court found unpersuasive the 
plaintiffs' argument that the surveyor's failure to disclose the existence of 
the seasonal stream was an unfair or deceptive act under chapter 93A. 73 
The Boston Survey Court determined that the surveyor played only a 
minor role in the sale of the property to the plaintiffs.74 The Court noted 
60 /d. (Abrams, J., dissenting). 
61 /d. at 318, 319, 446 N.E.2d at 681 (Abrams, J., dissenting). 
62 /d. at 318, 446 N.E.2d at 681 (Abrams, J., dissenting). 
63 /d. 




68 388 Mass. 320, 446 N.E.2d 681 (1983). 
69 /d. at 325, 446 N.E.2d at 684. 
7o !d. at 322, 446 N.E.2d at 683. 
71 /d. 
72 !d. at 323, 446 N.E.2d at 683. 
73 /d. at 325, 446 N.E.2d at 683-84. 
7< /d. at 324, 446 N.E.2d at 684. 
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that the surveyor did not participate in the negotiations or in the signing of 
the purchase and sale agreement. 75 While recognizing that privity of 
contract is not required under chapter 93A, the Court nevertheless noted 
that the surveyor had no contractual or business relationship with the 
plaintiffs. 76 Consequently, the Court declined to impose the risk ofliabil-
ity under chapter 93A on the surveyor of the land for giving the seller a 
statement of soil test which, though accurate, did not contain an explana-
tion of the test results. 77 
In summary, N ei v. Burley reaffirmed that a seller of real estate or his 
broker has no duty to reveal latent defects known to them, but not to the 
buyer, which materially reduce the value of the property. 78 The Supreme 
Judicial Court thus refused to join the growing number of other jurisdic-
tions which have retreated from the doctrine of caveat emptor in the sale 
of real estate and have imposed an affirmative duty upon the sellers to 
reveal latent defects. 79 The Burley decision therefore highlights an unfor-
tunate inconsistency in Massachusetts law. While Massachusetts pro-
vides consumers with significant protection against defects in purchased 
goods, such as through the implied warranties of fitness and merchantabil-
ity, it gives little protection against the potential of ruinous financial 
problems attributable to defects in a purchased home. 
Criticism can also be made of the Burley Court's determination that the 
broker was not liable for nondisclosure under chapter 93A. In a cursory 
analysis, the Court stated that it could see no unfair or deceptive act in the 
failure of the broker to disclose that a previous buyer withdrew from the 
deal because of water on the lot. 80 The Court emphasized that the broker 
did not know about the culvert under the road which was a major source 
of the water problem.81 The Burley Court was wrong in its assessment of 
the broker's culpability because whether the broker had an understanding 
of the source of the water problem or not, she at least knew that there was 
enough of a water problem to cause a prior interested party to withdraw 
from the deal. If the broker knew that some sort of water problem existed, 
it is difficult to see why her ignorance of the source of the water problem 
should render the nondisclosure, as the Court described it, "particularly 
innocuous.'' Moreover it is safe to say that the disclosure by the broker of 
the withdrawal of a previous buyer due to water problems could have 
been enough to influence the subsequent purchasers not to enter into the 
75 ld. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 324, 325, 446 N.E.2d at 684. 
78 388 Mass. at 310, 446 N.E.2d at 676-77. 
79 See cases cited in Annot., 90 A.L.R. 3d 583-93 (1979). See also RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 551 comment e (1977). 
80 388 Mass. at 316, 446 N.E.2d at 679. 
81 ld. 
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transaction. The information possessed by the broker, therefore, was 
material information under chapter 93A standards. 82 Consequently, the 
Burley Court should have found the broker liable for nondisclosure under 
the Consumer Protection Act. 
The Court's reluctance to impose liability on the broker under chapter 
93A is inconsistent with the goal of the statute, which is to strike an 
equitable balance between consumers and the person conducting busi-
ness.83 The Burley Court's holding that the broker did not have sufficient 
knowledge of the water problem to be liable for nondisclosure gives 
brokers the license to ignore clear indications that there are problems with 
the property. The failure of the broker in Burley to disclose information 
about the water problem resulted in the purchasers having to incur thou-
sands of dollars in additional costs when they attempted to build a home 
on the lot. 84 The nondisclosure by brokers of serious defects in real estate 
is the type of unfair and deceptive practice from which consumers most 
certainly need protection under chapter 93A. 
As a result of the Burley decision, the Court also limited the ability of 
purchasers to recover damages for defects in real estate by holding that 
the sellers of the property were exempt from liability under chapter 93A.85 
The holding in Burley extends the Court's previous decision inLantner v. 
Carson, 86 in which the Court found that a homeowner was not in ''trade or 
business" and therefore was not liable under chapter 93A when he mis-
represented the condition of his home to a purchaser. The Burley decision 
extends Lantner because Burley involved not the sale of an individual's 
home, but the sale of one lot which was part of a 14 acre tract that the 
owners had partially subdivided and intended to market. 87 The Burley 
Court was persuaded that the sellers were not ''in business'' because 
neither the husband nor the wife spent any appreciable part of their time 
in real estate dealings and were not actively engaged in the marketing of 
the lot. 88 The Burley opinion therefore suggests that individuals who 
subdivide and sell property which they have held as an investment, but 
who are not actively engaged in the marketing and sale of the real estate, 
may be exempt from chapter 93A liability. 
Following the recent decisions of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court in Nei v. Burley and Nei v. Boston Survey Consultants, purchasers 
should continue to beware for their financial well-being when entering into 
a real estate transaction. Because the traditional rule of caveat emptor has 
82 See Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 332 N.E.2d 768 (1975). 
83 See Rice, supra note 7, at 307. 
84 See Brief for the Plaintiffs-Appellants at 19, 21, Nei v. Burley, 388 Mass. 307 (1983). 
85 388 Mass. at 318, 446 N.E.2d at 680. 
86 374 Mass. 606, 373 N.E.2d 973 (1978). 
87 Burley, 388 Mass. at 317, 446 N.E.2d at 680. 
88 388 Mass. at 318, 446 N.E.2d at 680. 
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been reaffirmed by the Massachusetts high court, purchasets will have no 
recourse against sellers who transfer seriously defective real estate unless 
the seller makes affirmative misrepresentations or half-truths about the 
condition of the property. Furthermore, purchasers will have limited 
recourse against real estate brokers under chapter 93A upless the pur-
chasers can show that the broker had at least more knoiwledge of the 
defects in the property than did the broker in Burley. T~ protect their 
interests, prospective buyers of real estate should hire their own sur-
veyors, engineers or qualified housing inspectors to review the property 
and report any potential problems before entering into an agreement to 
purchase. · 
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